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SPEECH AND LAW IN A FREE SOCIETY.

Franklyn S. Haiman's Speech and Law In a Free Society examines the
interplay of forces that constrain and encourage "freedom of expression" 1
in American society. Haiman's book does not offer well-defined rules of
law or clear indications of likely judicial outcomes in first amendment
cases. Rather, it focuses on what the author believes the law should be.
Haiman acknowledges the "lack of consensus in our society concerning the
basic purposes and values underlying the First Amendment" (p. 5), and
offers a thorough analysis of many current first amendment issues based
upon his own values. Readers interested in democratic theory, as well as
the uninitiated seeking exposure to first amendment issues will find
Haiman's assertions of his values and principles useful catalysts in the precipitation of their own perspectives on the first amendment.
Haiman begins by outlining the values and principles underlying his
theories. He then discusses a multitude of interests that compete with freedom of expression, analyzing them in light of the values he asserts. Haiman
outlines the historical progression of court decisions relating to each issue,
and then theorizes about what the law should be.
Haiman concludes his analysis by proposing four principles for resolving conflicts between freedom of expression and other competing interests
(pp. 425-26): (1) the·remedy for injury caused by speech should be more
speech; (2) individuals in a free society are responsible for their own behavior, unless deprived of free choice by deception, physical coercion or mental
impairment; (3) if the market place of ideas remains open, individuals are
the best judges of their own interests; and (4) government must have a compelling justification whenever it requires unwilling communication or withholds information it possesses. Haiman admits that a society that honored
these principles would not suit the "squeamish or apathetic" (p. 429).
In general, Haiman's concluding principles effectively synthesize both
his own normative analysis and the principles of classic liberal political theory from which they derive. 2 Some of his more radical claims, however,
conflict not only with widely held liberal values but with other portions of
his argument as well.
Haiman concludes, for example, that the principle of repairing injury
I. Haiman chooses to consider "speech" and "the press" as "identical twins,'' deserving of
the same constitutional protection. The word "expression" is used here to include both terms.
Haiman does not concentrate on this point; he discusses the possible constitutional distinctions
between the terms only briefly. He is quite prepared to accept "a bit of constitutional redundancy" (p. 15) to avoid any confusion that might exist if the terms were accorded different
treatment. Former Justice Potter Stewart argues for separate treatment for speech and the
press. See Stewart, "Or of the Press," 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631 (1975); see also w. BERNS, THE
FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1976).
2. Much ofHaiman's thought can be traced to Mill, and the gist of many of his arguments
for free expression to Milton's classic argument against the licensing of books. See generally J.
s. MILL, ON LIBERTY, in XVIII WORKS 213 (J. Robson ed. 1977); J. MILTON, AREOPAGlTlCA
(R. Jebb ed. 1918).
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caused by free speech with more speech justifies a major retrenchment in
the law of defamation (pp. 43-60). Haiman argues for conditioning defamation actions for damages on the defendant's refusal to retract or furnish a
forum for reply, and for eliminating the "reckless disregard" element of the
New York Times standard,3 thus requiring proof of knowing falsity before
a plaintiff could recover. Reliance on the right to reply assumes that replies
by the defamed can restore their reputations, and that enforcement of the
right will be less coercive than a damage remedy. Haiman concedes that
certain libels may inflict irreparable injury, and that the denial of wrongdoing by the subject of suspicion is less credible than judgment of an impartial
court to the same effect. He would retain the damage remedy for those
cases (few in number, he believes) of irreparable injury, and trust the public's perception of the truth (as we do with politics and religion) to mitigate
the need for judicial intervention. The defense, while admirable, is
unconvincing.
The right to reply remedy is largely illusory. As a unanimous Supreme
Court pointed out in Tomillo, 4 an enforced right to reply will chill and
displace speech as readily as any other form of censorship. Conditioning
libel suits on the denial of reply space or time by the defendant might pass
the test of constitutionality under Tomi/lo, but only because the remedy
could be rejected by the defendant. If the underlying reasoning of Tomi/lo
is correct, as Haiman appears to concede, defendants will either categorically opt for a court contest (if the costs of litigation, including the risk of
judgment, are less than the costs of publishing replies) or, more likely, simply avoid any communication that might provoke the demand for reply
space (if the costs of reply exceed the benefits of controversial speech). The
result would be either a uniform fall-back on current defamation law, or the
serious restraint of vigorous debate on controversial issues implicating personal reputations. In the latter scenario, truth and falsehood would grapple
only in the minds of cautious journalists, and the public would never get the
chance to exercise its judgment.
As for modifying the New York Times standard, reckless disregard
comes into play only given proof of actual falsity. 5 If knowingly false
speech deserves no constitutional protection, as Haiman concedes, the constitutional case for reckless falsehood rests on little stronger ground.
Whatever the motivation behind it, falsity cannot advance the search for
truth, or expose actual political misconduct. Chilling reckless expression in
general is costly only insofar as reckless expression leads to truth rather
than to falsehood, and then only if the exercise of due care would not also
lead to the truth - a rare coincidence. Given the nearly impossible burden
of proving actual knowledge of falsity, that cost is more than justified.
Refusing to hold individuals liable for damages inflicted by defamatory
falsehoods is also somewhat at odds with Haiman's second principle, that
individuals should be responsible for their own behavior.6 Requiring only
3. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 255 (1964).
4. Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
5. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 78 ("the New York Times rule ••• absolutely
prohibits punishment of truthful criticism").
6. Haiman develops his principle of individual responsibility in his discussion of audience
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a right to reply would do little to bring reckless representatives of the media
to account, and nothing at all to confront nonmedia defendants with the
consequences of their actions. More profoundly, to the extent that the liberal tradition of free expression derives from the desire to restrain concentrated power, Haiman's belief in the power of solitary truth to counteract
mass falsehood contradicts the fundamental premise of his argument. If
communication has power to check government7 it also has power to injure
individuals. Restraints on private as well as public power can contribute to
the individual autonomy Haiman views as fundamental.
Though Haiman's arguments sometimes lack any substance greater than
Jeffersonian faith in the people, his book succeeds in its ultimate goal: it
offers a careful analysis of some of the most troublesome issues involving
freedom of expression. The book will aid readers in "crystallizing their
own alternative [approaches] to those issues" (p. 6). One may benefit from
the breadth and thoroughness of his analysis even if one differs fundamentally with Haiman's political starting point. Although many well-written
publications8 have focused on the first amendment, Speech and Law in a
Free Society offers an up-to-date and unflinching approach to many of the
most controversial challenges to freedom of expression facing the courts
today. Haiman does not attempt a new or innovative approach to constitutional analysis, but he does present the issues clearly and coherently. He
identifies and discusses many of the values of other first amendment scholars, but he does not seek to replace them. Instead, he proposes his own set
of values to set, with the values of other scholars, among the "foundation
stones of our First Amendment edifice" (p. 443 n.6). Haiman's perspective
and convictions are thought-provoking at the very least, and may someday
set the course for an American society better prepared to weather the "boisterous sea of liberty" (p. 429) which Haiman would have us sail.9

violence in reaction to the ideas of a controversial speaker. He argues convincingly that the
members of the audience who resort to violence should be held responsible for their actions,
not the inciting speaker (pp. 252-83). He also does not argue that injury done by defamatory
communication should be the responsibility of the communicator (pp. 87-99).
7. For this refinement of Meiklejohn's self-government rationale advanced in FREE
SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948), see Blasi, The Checking Value in
First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. BAR. FEDN. RES. J. 521.
8. See, e.g.,
BERNS,supra n.2;
CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH INTHE UNITED STATES (1941);
T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970); L. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY (1960).
9. Haiman's book is also reviewed by Boylan, Book Review, 20 COLUM. JOURNALISM REV.
59 (1982); Cantor, Book Review, LIBRARY J., Dec. 15, 1982, at 2380.
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